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Comments of Legal Academics on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0001 
 
April 25, 2018 
Monica Jackson 
Office of the Executive Secretary 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
1700 G Street NW 
Washington, DC 20552 
 
Dear Ms. Jackson: 
Please see the submission below in response to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's  
Request for Information ("RFI") Regarding Bureau Civil Investigative Demands and Associated 
Processes (Docket No. CFPB-2018-0001).  We are legal academics who research and teach 
about consumer protection law, public enforcement of civil law, administrative law and related 
topics.1 Many of the below signatories also have experience in public enforcement of consumer 
protection laws. We appreciate the opportunity to submit these comments for your consideration. 
 
Prentiss Cox 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School 
Former Manager, Consumer Enforcement Division, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office  
 
Christopher L.  Peterson 
John J. Flynn Endowed Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law 
Senior Fellow, Consumer Federation of America 
Former Senior Counsel, Office of Enforcement, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
 
Richard Alderman 
Professor Emeritus, Director Center for Consumer Law, University of Houston Law Center 
 
William Black 
Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri- Kansas City 
 
Susan Block-Lieb 
Cooper Family Professor of Urban Legal Issues, Fordham Law School 
 
Lauren Dreshman 
Associate Professor, Paralegal and Law Program Director, Sinclair College 
 
                                                          
1 Affiliations of signatories are for identifications only and do not represent the views of the various institutions.  
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Kate Elengold 
Clinical Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law 
Director, Consumer Financial Transactions Clinic 
Former Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice 
 
Kathleen Engel 
Research Professor, Suffolk University Law School 
 
Jeffrey Gentes 
Visiting Clinical Lecturer, Yale Law School 
 
Robert Fellmeth 
Price Professor of Public Interest Law, University of San Diego School of Law 
 
Linda Fisher 
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law 
 
Anne Fleming 
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center 
 
Pamela Foohey 
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law 
 
Judith Fox 
Clinical Professor, Notre Dame Law School 
 
Michael Greenfield 
George Alexander Madill Professor of Contracts and Commercial Law, Washington University 
in St. Louis 
 
Dalie Jimenez 
Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law 
 
Kathleen Keest 
Retired 
Former Iowa Attorney General’s Office, Consumer Protection Division 
 
Daniela Kraiem 
Associate Director, Women and the Law Program, American University, Washington College of 
Law 
 
Lea Krivinskas Shepard 
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law  
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Adam Levitin 
Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law. Georgetown University Law Center 
 
Angela Littwin 
Ronald D. Krist Professor of Law, University of Texas 
 
Cathy Mansfield 
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School 
 
Nathalie Martin 
Frederick M. Hart Chair in Consumer and Clinical Law, University of New Mexico School of 
Law 
 
Patricia McCoy 
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School 
 
Christopher Odinet 
Horatio C. Thompson Assistant Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center 
 
Gary Pieples 
Teaching Professor & Clinic Director, Syracuse University 
 
David Reiss 
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School 
 
Jacob Rugh 
Assistant Professor of Sociology, Brigham Young University 
 
Ann Shalleck 
Professor of Law and Carrington Shields Scholar, American University, Washington College of 
Law 
 
Alexandra Sickler 
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law 
 
Norman I. Silber 
Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University 
Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School 
 
Neil Sobol 
Professor of Law, Director of Legal Analysis, Research & Writing, Texas A&M University 
School of Law 
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Gregory Squires 
Professor of Sociology and Public Policy & Public Administration, George Washington 
University 
 
Mark E. Steiner 
Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law-Houston 
 
Mark Totten 
Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law 
 
Rebecca Tushnet 
Frank Stanton Professor of First Amendment Law, Harvard Law School 
 
William Vukowich 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
 
Alan White 
Professor, CUNY School of Law 
 
Amy Widman 
Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law 
 
Arthur Wilmarth 
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School 
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SUMMARY 
 
• The statutory authority and regulations for Bureau CID issuance are modeled on FTC 
powers.  Decades of experience by the FTC and state attorneys general with substantially 
similar CID authority support broad discretion and flexibility in CID use for effective 
public enforcement of UDAP laws. Courts have consistently so held.  
 
• The Bureau’s enforcement actions to date have produced remarkable results for 
consumers. Even if the Bureau decides to shift its enforcement strategy, there is no need 
to change its CID procedures to accomplish this new direction, especially given the 
Bureau’s statutory mandate to enforce consumer protection under a plethora of different 
federal laws. 
 
• The Office of the Inspector General of the Federal Reserve Board recently conducted an 
independent examination of the Bureau’s use of CIDs and concluded that its procedures 
maintained an appropriate balance between the Bureau’s investigatory needs and the 
burden on CID recipients, and found no substantial irregularities or deficiencies in 
Bureau CID use. 
 
 
THE BUREAU NEEDS BROAD AND FLEXIBLE CID AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT 
EFFECTIVE UDAP AND OTHER CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT. 
One of the most salient features of public enforcement of federal and state UDAP law is the 
authority of public enforcers to engage in pre-complaint investigations.  Numerous public 
enforcement officials and academic commentators have remarked on the importance of Civil 
Investigative Demand (“CID”) authority to effective public enforcement.2  
Although the Bureau is a relatively recent creation, its CID authority reflects decades of 
experience in public enforcement of UDAP laws, and in particular the experience of the other 
                                                          
2 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 747, 761 
(2016) (Professor Citron is the Morton & Sophia Macht Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of 
Law; an Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Center on Internet & Society; and an Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society 
Project. Writing about UDAP actions on privacy issues, she observes that “…civil investigative demands (CIDs), 
are crucial to investigations.”); Pamela H. Bucy, Federalism and False Claims, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1599, 1608 
(2007) (Professor Bucy, Research Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, is a former Assistant 
United States Attorney. She completed a study of thirteen states with state laws similar to the federal False Claims 
Act. Based on interviews, she concluded based on interviews that “[a]ll of the offices with CID authority agree that 
CIDs are extremely powerful prosecutorial tools. In the Attorney General's offices in the eight states without CID 
powers, all but two indicated that such powers would be helpful.”); Darren Bush, The Incentive and Ability of the 
Federal Trade Commission to Investigate Real Estate Markets: An Exercise in Political Economy, 35 Real Est. L.J. 
33, 37 (2006) (Professor Bush, University of Houston Law School, holds a Ph.D. in economics and J.D. and is a 
former DOJ attorney in antitrust enforcement. He notes that “the FTC's ability to obtain complete and accurate 
information primarily rests with the Civil Investigative Demand (CID) and subpoena.”) 
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primary federal UDAP regulator, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).3 The Bureau’s CID 
powers also align with the authority given to state attorneys general to enforce UDAP laws. We 
urge the new leadership of the  Bureau to consider any reforms to CID processes in light of the 
accumulated knowledge gained from decades of public enforcement experience of UDAP laws 
by a diverse range of public officials. 
A. The Bureau’s CID Authority Parallels the CID Authority of the FTC and Other 
Public Enforcers of Consumer Protection Laws. 
 
Any consideration of possible changes to the CID authority of the Bureau must start with an 
understanding of the place of pre-complaint investigatory procedures in public enforcement. The 
specific CID authority of the Bureau and its procedures for exercising that authority, as 
articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act and in the Bureau’s regulations, are substantially similar to the 
authority and procedures that govern other public enforcers.   
The other primary federal regulator with UDAP authority, the FTC, is the closest point of 
comparison. The substance of what constitutes a deceptive or unfair practice for Bureau-
regulated entities mirrors the UDAP standards developed by the FTC in the early 1980s.4  
Similarly, the CID authority of the Bureau in the Dodd-Frank Act is substantially derived from 
and comparable to the FTC’s CID authority.5  
The same is true of the Bureau’s regulations implementing its CID authority. In adopting its CID 
regulations, the Bureau expressly noted its reliance on existing FTC procedures: 
[T]he Final Rule is modeled on investigative procedures of other law enforcement 
agencies. For guidance, the Bureau reviewed the procedures currently used by the 
FTC, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the prudential 
regulators, as well as the FTC’s recently proposed amendments to its 
nonadjudicative procedures. In light of the similarities between section 1052 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and section 20 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 
15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., the Bureau drew most heavily from the FTC’s nonadjudicative 
procedures in constructing the rules.6 
The Office of the Inspector General of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors concluded in its 
recent report on the Bureau’s use of CIDs that, “the FTC’s CID authority is similar to the 
CFPB’s.”7 
                                                          
3 We use the abbreviation “UDAP” to mean either Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, the law enforced by the 
FTC, or any other federal or state variant of that law, including the Bureau’s authority over abusive conduct.  
4 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) with FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (appended to International Harvester Co., 
104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984)); Compare CFPB Supervision and Examination Manual UDAAP 5-7 (August 2017)  
with FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 174 (1984). 
5 Compare 12 U.S.C.  § 5562 (CFPB Authority) with 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (FTC authority) 
6 77 Fed. Reg. 39101 (June 29, 2012). 
7 The Office of Inspector General of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The CFPB Generally 
Complies with Requirements for Issuing Civil Investigative Demands but Can Improve Certain Guidance and 
Centralize Recordkeeping, Evaluation Report 2017-SR-015 at 5 n.9 (September 2017) [hereinafter “Inspector 
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Courts resolving disputes over the proper use of CID authority by the FTC have consistently 
upheld the need for a broad and flexible application of this investigative authority. In the seminal 
case on the use of CIDs by federal agencies, U.S. v. Morton Salt Co.,8 the United States Supreme 
Court made clear that CID authority of the FTC is not to be confused with, and thus cannot be 
restricted by, the limits on discovery in judicial actions. As the Court explained: 
The only power that is involved here is the power to get information from those 
who best can give it and who are most interested in not doing so. Because judicial 
power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant 
to issues in litigation, it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with 
seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original 
inquiry. It has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not 
derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which 
does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can 
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because 
it wants assurance that it is not.9  
Federal courts have consistently given a wide berth to the FTC in structuring its CIDs and 
rejected challenges from CID recipients premised on the relevance of the requested information. 
These judicial opinions note the importance of not prematurely limiting the flexibility and scope 
of FTC investigations. As one court observed, it is improper to ask the FTC to “prove what it is 
investigating as a condition of the legitimacy of the investigation.”10 In an oft-cited en banc 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, rejecting a challenge 
to a CID issued by the FTC, the court held that, “a wide range of investigation is necessary and 
appropriate where, as here, multifaceted activities are involved, and the precise character of 
possible violations cannot be known in advance,”11 and the CID was proper because it was not 
“obviously wrong.”12  
Similar CID authority also is a cornerstone of the power that state attorneys general hold as 
public enforcers of state UDAP laws. Almost every state attorney general can use CIDs  when 
investigating possible violations of state laws.13 While the specific powers and requirements vary 
by state,14 the need for some general statement of notice as to the possible violations and the 
                                                          
General Report”]. The Inspector General also observed that:  “[t]he CFPB modeled the investigation rules on the 
investigative procedures of other federal agencies with enforcement authority, such as the FTC and the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.” Id. at 5. Compare 12 C.F.R. 1080.5-.6 (CFPB CID regulations) with 16 
C.F.R. 2.7 (FTC CID regulations). 
8 338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
9 Id. at 633-634. 
10 F.T.C. v. Church & Dwight Co., 747 F. Supp. 2d 3, 6 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd, 665 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
11 FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 862, 877 INTERNAL (D.C.Cir.1977) (en banc). 
12 Id. at 877 n.32. 
13 National Association of Attorneys General (Emily Myers, Ed. And Principal Author) , State Attorney General 
Powers and Responsibilities 232-233 (3d Ed. 2013) (noting that all but four state attorneys general have CID 
authority for consumer protection enforcement, and in two of those states the CID authority rests with a different 
consumer protection regulator). 
14 See generally National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices §13. 3 (9th Ed. 2016) 
(analyzing requirements of varying state CID laws). 
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power to compel document production and testimony are common.15 Like their federal 
counterparts, state courts reviewing CID requests typically allow state attorneys general a broad 
purview in their use of CIDs. As Professors Dee Pridgen and Richard Alderman observe, state 
“pre-complaint discovery power is usually construed quite liberally by the courts to allow the 
state attorney general's office to effectively enforce the state consumer protection statute.”16 
Judicial decisions on the Bureau’s authority to enforce its CIDs reflect the broad discretion 
afforded the agency to pursue its investigations. Federal courts have overwhelmingly granted 
enforcement of Bureau CIDs.17 As a district court observed in a February 28, 2018 decision 
granting a Bureau petition to enforce a CID, “like every other administrative agency, the CFPB 
can define the contours of its investigation ‘quite generally’ while still complying with its 
statutory obligations.”18 Of course, CID authority has limits. In particular, courts will not enforce 
a CID that describes an investigation beyond the authority of the agency, which occurred with 
the Bureau when a court rejected enforcement of a CID on determining the Bureau lacked 
authority over the CID recipient.19 
B.  Discretion and Flexibility in CID Authority Allows the Bureau to Tailor CID 
Requirements to Specific Applications of Its Broad Enforcement Authority.  
Decades of experience with CID use by a variety of federal and state enforcers demonstrate that 
broad and flexible CID authority is critical to effective, efficient and fair public enforcement of 
consumer protection laws. A concern raised by the focus of the RFI solely on the rights of 
investigatory targets is that the Bureau will consider promulgating rules that would later prevent 
it from adapting its investigatory procedures to the needs of the different sorts of investigations 
undertaken by the Bureau. Even if rules restricting CID use were consistent with the Bureau’s 
substantial statutory investigative authority in the Dodd-Frank Act, it is difficult imagine how the 
Bureau can impose limitations on the use of CIDs that would be equally appropriate in the wide 
variety of enforcement contexts for which it is responsible to act under the Dodd-Frank Act.  
 1. Varying Enforcement Cases Require Varying Uses of CID Authority. 
The Bureau has an exceptionally broad enforcement mandate. To fulfill that mandate, its CID 
authority cannot be bound by the kinds of rigid rules that govern litigation. In some situations, 
the Bureau needs to request relatively small amounts of material from an investigatory target. In 
                                                          
15 Id.  
16 Dee Pridgen and Richard Alderman, Consumer Protection and the Law § 7:2 (2017). 
17 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Great Plains Lending, LLC, 846 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 555 
(2017) (affirming district court refusal to set aside Bureau CID); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, V. 
Heartland Campus Solutions, Esci., No. CV 17-1502, 2018 WL 1089806 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2018) (granting Bureau 
petition to enforce CID); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law, LLC, No. 817CV01081JLSJEM, 2017 WL 
6536586 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) (granting Bureau petition to enforce CID); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. 
Source for Pub. Data, LP, No. 3:17-MC-16-G-BN, 2017 WL 2443135 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2017) (same). 
18 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, V. Heartland Campus Solutions, Esci., No. CV 17-1502, 2018 WL 
1089806, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2018) (quoting the district court in Seila Law, which cited FTC cases). 
19 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colleges & Sch., 854 F.3d 683 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(affirming district court refusal to grant Bureau petition to enforce CID for lack of authority over the CID recipient). 
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others, particularly where there are multiple potential legal claims, numerous institutions, or very 
large targets, the CIDs must reflect the complexity of the investigation. 
The Bureau combines authority to enforce its UDAP law with the authority to enforce violations 
of numerous product specific or area specific consumer finance regulatory regimes. The 
Bureau’s enforcement reach varies across multiple dimensions, including the following: 
Investigatory Stage. Public enforcement investigations are initiated with varying 
amounts of information acquired from an array of possible sources. One source is the 
Bureau’s complaint portal which receives millions of complaints. The FTC Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, for instance, “reported receiving over 3 million complaints, not 
including Do Not Call Registry complaints, during 2016. And staff commence 
investigations based on information uncovered in other investigations; requests from 
Congress, other federal agencies, and state enforcers; the staff's own experiences as 
consumers; and after monitoring industry activities, particularly after issuing new 
guidance.”20 The same is true of the Bureau. 
Focusing its investigatory resources: The Bureau, like other government entities, 
cannot pursue all the possible violations of the law that come to its attention. While it 
has the authority to bring enforcement actions against entities of various sizes, 
compared to other public UDAP enforcers, the Bureau rarely proceeds against small 
companies.21 Similarly, the Bureau typically does not target individuals except as part 
of an investigation of a targeted entity with which the individuals are connected.22 
The Bureau has been judicious in its selection of targets and use of CIDs. 
Supervisory Structure. The Bureau has used its enforcement powers to bring cases 
against banks and non-banks, including-- among others-- mortgage servicers and 
credit reporting agencies.23 The type of institution and its products or actions under 
investigation influence the content of the CIDs.  
Type of Law Violation. Congress charged the Bureau with enforcing a complex and 
diverse array of statutes. In addition to the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which 
Congress adopted as Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress tasked the Bureau with 
responsibility for eighteen “enumerated” consumer financial laws.  These statutes 
include nearly all federal consumer credit consumer protection statutes.24 The statutes 
                                                          
20 Howard Morse & Sarah Swain, Defending Federal Trade Commission Consumer Protection Investigations: A 
How-to Guide, Antitrust, Summer 2017, at 26, 27. See also David C. Shonka, Responding to the Government's Civil 
Investigations, 15 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 2 (2014) (noting that public enforcement actions begin with  “news stories, 
consumer complaints, requests from Congress, leaks from informants, first-hand observations by government 
employees, self-reporting, or any number of other sources.”) 
21 Prentiss Cox, Amy Widman, and Mark Totten, Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 Harv. J. on 
Legislation 37 (providing data showing substantial gap between mean and median size of defendants by both annual 
revenue and number of employees, suggesting substantial variance in company size).  
22 Id.; Christopher L.  Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 
Tulane L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1083 (2016). 
23 Peterson, supra note 21 at 1084-1085. 
24 12 U.S.C. § 5481(a)(12). Also, Congress later gave the CFPB enforcement authority under the Military Lending 
Act. 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(6). 
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cover a range of subject matters that include credit, debt collection practices, payment 
systems, savings accounts, prepaid cards, interstate land purchases, reputational 
information, advertising, information sharing, discrimination, and personal privacy. 
Even within the topic of consumer credit, the Bureau is responsible for enforcing the 
law with respect to both secured and unsecured credit, large and small loans, as well 
as open-ended lines of credit and closed-end loans. Collectively these statutes touch 
the lives of virtually every American consumer. Professor Peterson’s study shows that 
through 2016 the Bureau brought enforcement actions not only under UDAP, but also 
for violations of TILA, FCRA, ECOA, FDCPA, EFTA, and RESPA.25 
  
Remedial Purpose. The Bureau can seek to resolve cases with injunctive or 
supervisory terms regulating future conduct, public compensation to consumers 
and/or a civil penalty. The type of relief sought also influences the material sought in 
CIDs. To date, the Bureau appears to seek all these forms of relief when it treats a 
matter as an enforcement action; however, it has the option of seeking only some 
forms of relief in each case.   
For all the permutations of investigations based on the above and many other factors, the Bureau 
has one CID pre-complaint investigatory power. The experience of a systemically important 
national bank in responding to a CID indicating possible UDAP concerns in the sale of ancillary 
products through credit card or other account add-on may raise concerns that are wholly different 
from a CID issued in an investigation of a regional furniture rent-to-own company engaged in 
possible violations of the Truth in Lending Act. The CID powers provided in the Dodd-Frank 
Act and the Bureau’s existing regulations can be adapted on a case by case basis to accommodate 
the proper balance between justifiable burden on the CID recipient and the need for information 
to protect consumers in that market or type of transaction. 
Again, the long FTC experience in public UDAP enforcement is instructive when it comes to 
understanding the need for the Bureau to have flexible CID authority. The FTC has developed 
different investigatory regimes for its antitrust work and its UDAP work. Former FTC attorneys 
Howard Morse and Sarah Swain provide a summary of this difference: 
In contrast to merger investigations, where the FTC has issued a model Second 
Request and announced a presumptive limit on the number of custodians to be 
searched and number of years to be covered, CIDs in consumer protection matters 
vary widely. A 2014 ABA study found the cost of responding to a Second 
Request ranges from $2 million to $9 million, with a median cost of $4.3 million 
and a per custodian median cost of $151,000. In our experience, the burden of 
complying with a consumer protection CID varies widely though is generally less 
than the burden of responding to a Second Request.26 
Because the Bureau’s enforcement authority is even more diverse than that of the FTC, 
encompassing both UDAP and a broader range of other regulatory regimes, the need for 
                                                          
25 Peterson, supra note 21 at 1090. 
26 Morse and Swain, supra note 19, at 29. 
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the Bureau to maintain broad and flexible investigative powers is even greater than for 
the FTC. Accordingly, the CID authority of the Bureau should remain sufficiently 
flexible to allow for effective investigation of all types of law violations. In sum, there is 
no one-size-fits-all CID for Bureau investigations. Limits on the complexity and number 
of topics in CIDs could have the unintended consequence of privileging the entities most 
determined to obfuscate responses so as to prevent the Bureau from discovering the worst 
abuses. 
The FTC requires in consumer cases that one Commissioner approve a CID prior to 
issuance. This process allows the FTC to have review by one official who is in the line of 
authority for making determinations about violations of UDAP law. The Bureau has no 
similar procedure. The existing Bureau procedure reflects the difference in structure 
between the FTC as a multi-member Commission and the Bureau with its Director. The 
Bureau would have no analogous higher level review by a single official who is not also 
the person ultimately solely responsible for enforcement decision-making. 
 2. Flexible CIDs Allow the Bureau to Adopt Differing Enforcement Strategies.  
 
The enforcement record of the Bureau to date has been remarkable. The Bureau’s enforcement 
and supervision actions have led to $11.8 billion in ordered relief for more than 29 million 
consumers.27 There has been broad public support for the Bureau and its enforcement work.28 
Professor Christopher Peterson has published a detailed empirical study of Bureau enforcement 
actions in its first four years that reveals an agency that is both remarkably effective and 
completely at odds with descriptions of the agency by its critics. The study shows a balanced set 
of cases between banks and nonbanks and enforcement through administrative and judicial 
action. The study also shows that the Bureau focused less on technical rule violations and more 
on UDAP violations in actions that returned money to consumers, and used sparingly the new 
“abusiveness” power it has as part of its UDAP authority.29 As the study observes: 
…if the CFPB were continually overstepping its bounds, then perhaps critics of the 
agency ought to be able to point to many decisions of district court judges, 
administrative law judges, or U.S. courts of appeal dismissing the agency’s 
unlawful actions. Yet, from its inception through 2015, the agency publicly 
announced 122 enforcement actions without losing a single case. And after the 
                                                          
27 CFPB Factsheet, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: By the Numbers (December 2016) 
28 Steve Eder, Jessical Silver-Greenberg, & Stacy Cowley, Republicans Want to Sideline This Regulator. But It May 
Be Too Popular, N.Y.Times, Aug. 31, 2017 (“’The public does not share the G.O.P.’s ire toward the agency and its 
mission,’ said Dean Clancy, a Tea Party activist who worked in the White House under Preident George W. Bush 
and is now a policy analyst who tracks actions of the consumer bureau. ‘It’s an agency about protectiong the little 
guy, and that is tough to oppose.’”); Celinda Lake, Bob Carpenter, David Mermin, and Zoe Grotophorst, New Poll 
Reveals Strong Bipartisan Support for Financial Regulation; Americans Say Wall Street’s Influence in Washington 
is Too High (July 18, 2017), available athttp://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2017/07/afrcrl-polling-memo-fifth-
consecutive-year-broad-backing-cfpb-wall-street-reform/ (finding that 77 percent of independents and 66 percent of 
Republicans “favor somewhat” or “favor strongly” the CFPB). 
29 Peterson, supra note 21. 
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study period, but prior to publication of this Article, the Bureau had lost only 1 
precomplaint discovery dispute.30 
Even in well-publicized challenges to later Bureau actions, the Bureau retains an 
overwhelmingly successful track record in litigation.  
An example of the positive impact on consumer markets of Bureau enforcement actions is the 
series of cases it brought to curb a practice variously known as credit card add-on, data pass, or 
pre-acquired account charges.31 In short, the nation’s largest banks have sold to direct marketing 
companies special contract rights allowing them to charge a range of consumer bank accounts 
(including credit card, checking and mortgage accounts) without obtaining traditional forms of 
consent from the consumer, such as having the consumer provide his or her account number.  
Predictably, the result has been massive deception of consumers charged for unwanted 
membership clubs and insurance policies of dubious value. The elderly and those with limited 
English language capacity were especially hard hit by this deceptive practice.32 
Years of UDAP enforcement cases by state attorneys general to attack this problem made 
progress, but they were unable to comprehensively attack this deceptive conduct.33 The Bureau, 
however, has effectively used its enforcement authority to systematically constrain this 
deception. Starting with its first enforcement action in 2012, the Bureau brought a series of cases 
against the nation’s largest financial institutions challenging this conduct as a UDAP violation, 
resulting in over $2 billion in returned account charges to consumers.34  
High levels of monetary recoveries and expansive injunctive and supervisory relief by the 
Bureau contrast with the approach of other public enforcers with substantially similar UDAP 
authority. A study of all public UDAP enforcement actions completed in 2014 by all federal and 
state entities with primary UDAP enforcement authority found different strategies employed by 
different public entities.35 Compared to other UDAP enforcers, the Bureau brought cases against 
defendants of much larger size and consistently obtained much larger public compensation 
dollars returned to consumers and much larger civil penalties. FTC enforcement showed a 
preference for cases against larger defendants to resolve with only injunctive relief, and 
effectively used asset freezes and appointment of receivers to ensure public compensation in 
                                                          
30 Id. at 1094. 
31 See General Accounting Office, Credit Cards: Consumer Costs for Debt Protection Products Can Be Substantial 
Relative to Benefits but Are Not a Focus of Regulatory Oversight (March 2011) (describing credit card add-on 
products); Prentiss Cox, The Invisible Hand of Preacquired Account Marketing, 47 Harv. J. on Legislation  425 
(2010) (describing how seller “preacquired account” rights obtained from account issuers result in consumer 
deception); . Staff Of The Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science, And Education, Aggressive Sales Tactics On The 
Internet And Their Impact On American Consumers (Comm. Print 2009) (discussing the problem of “data pass” of 
account charging rights from retailers causes consumer deception). 
32 Cox, supra note 30 at 445-446 and 452 (providing data showing, among other things, that the elderly proportion 
of those charged was twice the expected rate). 
33 Id. at 439-441 and 467-468.  
34 CFPB Factsheet, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Enforcing Federal Consumer Protection Laws 2-4 
(July 13, 2016) (listing the following add-on enforcement actions with associated consumer refunds in million $: 
Bank of  America/727; Citibank/700; Chase/309; Discover/200; Capital One/140; American Express/59.5;  Fifth 
Third/3).  
35 Cox, Widman and Totten, supra note 20.  
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cases with numerous small entity and individual defendants engaged in fraudulent schemes. State 
enforcers (primarily state attorneys general), in contrast, varied widely in their approach to 
UDAP enforcement. For example, almost a third of the states, including even some large states, 
showed relatively little use of their UDAP authority, while another group of states brought a 
substantial number of cases against tiny defendants. In all, the study identified eight different 
enforcement strategies employed by groups of states.36 
Importantly, these various public enforcers used different strategies for UDAP enforcement 
while maintaining similar, flexible CID procedures. Nothing in the current CID procedures of the 
Bureau prevent a re-focus of enforcement priorities on one of the other types of enforcement 
strategies, including the less active enforcement strategies employed by some state attorneys 
general. Broad discretion and flexibility in CID procedures are consistent with both the Bureau 
enforcement strategy to date and other approaches to public UDAP enforcement. 
As the Bureau looked to the FTC and other agencies with similar authority in developing its 
initial CID rules, we encourage this review of CID procedures to engage with and be judged 
against the experience of decades of public enforcement use of pre-complaint investigative 
procedures in enforcement of UDAP and other consumer protection laws.  
C. The Report of the Office of Inspector General of the Federal Reserve Board 
Confirms Bureau Policies and Practices Appropriately Balance the Bureau’s Need for 
Information with the Burden on CID Recipients. 
 
The many signatories to this letter who have extensive experience in public enforcement actions, 
and UDAP public enforcement specifically, know the importance of balancing the burdens 
imposed on the CID recipient against the possible gain in the specific enforcement investigation 
at hand. A public enforcer who asks too much given the likely value to the investigation will face 
an administrative or judicial challenge to the demand. If the enforcer asks too little, the 
investigation can be unreasonably delayed or the enforcer may fail to obtain information that 
would alert the agency to a violation of a consumer protection law, and thus fail in its essential 
public protection mission. 
 
After a thorough and independent review of the Bureau’s issuance of CIDs, the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Federal Reserve Board found no deficiencies in the Bureau’s policies, 
procedures and conduct in balancing these concerns, concluding that: 
Preparing and modifying a CID involves significant professional judgment to 
carefully balance the burden the CID places on the recipient against the CFPB’s 
need to obtain information necessary to conduct an investigation. The Office of 
Enforcement’s processes for CID approval and modification seek to strike that 
balance by allowing for substantial input from the CID recipient.37 
The Inspector General reached its conclusion after examining the Bureau’s rules and policies, 
including its “records management policy and the file plans for Office of Enforcement and 
                                                          
36 Id. 
37 Inspector General Report, supra note 6, at 10.  
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Office of the Director records,” and the Bureau’s actual practice of CID use, including a random 
selection of CIDs issued over a three year period along with “related documentation, such as 
CIDs, petitions, recommendation memorandums, and communications between the Office of 
Enforcement and the CID recipient.”38  
The report found that the Bureau’s Enforcement Office effectively identified the information 
needed for the investigation as part of each CID sampled by the Inspector General.39 It also 
found procedural compliance with all reviewed CIDs.40 As noted above, the Inspector General 
found the Bureau carefully weighed investigative need and the burden on the CID recipient. It 
also determined that after issuance the Bureau appropriately uses “modifications and extensions 
of time to alleviate some of the potential burden associated with CID requests.”41 The report 
described this practice as follows: “[W]e found that Office of Enforcement attorneys engage CID 
recipients in continuous dialogue during the CID issuance process, using meet and confers, 
modification letters, extension letters, and extension emails to address the potential burden and 
allow the recipient to successfully comply with the CID.”42 The only recommendations for 
change to Bureau CID procedures concerned a reminder to the staff in the Guidance concerning 
crafting notices of CID purposes and two record-keeping items.43 
To the extent that the RFI suggests a broad policy realignment of enforcement priorities toward 
the needs and concerns of CID recipients, rather than a review akin to the evaluation of the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Inspector General, it is important that the Bureau carefully weigh how 
such changes would impact the extraordinary results achieved by the Bureau’s enforcement 
actions to date. The complaints of CID recipients-- an inevitable feature of public enforcers 
actively doing their job-- should be carefully weighed against the impact of any shift in 
enforcement efforts that have to date focused primarily on the needs of American consumers. We 
urge that any proposed rule or guidance changes be accompanied by an analysis of specific 
examples of past Bureau enforcement outcomes that realistically would have been affected by 
restricted CID use in the context of the uncertain information available to Bureau enforcement 
staff at the time of CID issuance. Of course, it also is critical that the Bureau implement any such 
policy changes in a manner consistent with the law for CID use enunciated in the Dodd-Frank 
Act.  
                                                          
38 Id. at Appendix A. 
39 Id. at  8  (“We found that each of the sampled CIDs had a complete and accurate Action Required section, in 
which the litigation team indicated the appropriate types of information requested for each CID.) 
40 Id. at 9-10. 
41 Id. at 10. 
42 Id. at 10-11. In describing these Bureau practices, the Inspector General noted that the FTC and Bureau use 
“similar safeguards to help alleviate potential burdens in its CIDs.” Id. at 11. 
43 Id. at 8-9 and 13-15. 
